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The Points of Concepts:
Their Types, Tensions, and Connections
MATTHIEU QUELOZ
In the literature seeking to explain concepts in terms of their point, talk of
‘the point’ of concepts remains under-theorised. I propose a typology of
points which distinguishes practical, evaluative, animating, and inferential
points. This allows us to resolve tensions such as that between the ambition
of explanations in terms of the points of concepts to be informative and the
claim that mastering concepts requires grasping their point; and it allows
us to exploit connections between types of points to understand why they
come apart, and whether they do so for problematic ideological reasons or
for benignly functional reasons.
ABSTRACT
I n recent years, conceptual analyses in terms of a common core ofnecessary and sufficient conditions have lost currency in favour of
an approach that seems better suited to handling internally diverse
concepts exhibiting a family-resemblance structure: the approach
of point-based explanation.1 Point-based explanations seek to make
sense of concepts, and more particularly to understand why they
have the intension and extension they do, by inquiring into the point
of operating a concept with just these boundaries. From ethics to
epistemology, philosophers have proposed point-based explanations
of blame, forgiveness, truthfulness,understanding, knowledge, and testimony
which all explore the idea that even when one’s subject matter exhibits
an internal diversity which eludes sharp definition, it might turn out
1 This is the umbrella term I shall use to designate a family of methods that go
by a variety of names, such as ‘paradigm-based explanation,’ ‘practical explica-
tion,’ ‘genealogy,’ ‘reverse-engineering,’ ‘conceptual synthesis,’ and ‘function-first
epistemology,’ but which all take the point of something as their explanatory basis.
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to be held together by its overarching point.2 And in the growing
literature on conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, the point
of a concept is also sometimes appealed to as something that should
inform our attempts to improve the concepts we operate with.3
But despite its increasing prominence, talk of ‘the point’ of concepts
remains remarkably noncommittal and ambiguous. This ambiguity
is a problem. It is a problem not just for the obvious (though no less
compelling) reason that point-based explanations will only be as clear
and solid as the notion of a point they are based on. It is a problem also
for the more interesting reason that failure to disambiguate between
different types of points blinds us both to potential tensions and to
illuminating connections between them. The potential tensions come
into view once one recalls that there are several currents of thought in
philosophy which insist that one needs to grasp the point of a concept
in order to master it; this appears to conflict with the ambition of
point-based explanation to teach us something new by revealing the
point of a concept. As for the illuminating connections, they come into
view once one has disambiguated a concept’s different types of points
and asks, not just which point should form the basis of point-based
explanation, but also what the point of having these different points is.
The ambiguity that seemed an obstacle then becomes itself material
2 See, e.g., Anderson (1999); Craig (1990, 1993, 2007); Dogramaci (2012); Fricker (2016,
Forthcoming); Gardiner (2015); Greco and Henderson (2015); Hannon (2015, 2019);
Henderson (2009, 2011); Henderson and Horgan (2015); Kelp (2011); Kusch (2009);
Kusch and McKenna (2018a, 2018b); MacFarlane (2014); Mikkel (2015); Price (1988,
2003); Reynolds (2017); Williams (2002); Williams (2013).
3 See in particular Brigandt (2010); Brigandt and Rosario (Forthcoming); Dutilh
Novaes (2018); Haslanger (1999, 2000, 2012); Richard (Forthcoming); Thomasson
(Forthcoming). See also Burgess, Cappelen, and Plunkett (Forthcoming); Burgess
and Plunkett (2013a, 2013b); Cappelen and Plunkett (Forthcoming); McPherson
and Plunkett (Forthcoming); Plunkett (2015, 2016). For a critical discussion of
appeals to the points of concepts in conceptual engineering, see Cappelen (2018,
ch. 16), and Thomasson (Forthcoming) for a response.
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for point-based explanation, allowing us to see functional connections
between the different types of points which shed light on why they
come apart,andwhether theydo so forproblematic ideological reasons
or for benignly functional reasons.
Hence, in this paper, I propose to disambiguate talk of ‘the point’
of concepts and to develop a typology of points—not just in order to
put point-based explanation on a clear and solid foundation, but also
in order to resolve tensions with claims to the effect that mastery of
concepts is point-based and to show how point-based explanation can
harness the functional connections between different types of points.
I begin by showing, in §1, that talk of ‘the point’ of concepts really is
ambiguous and in need of disambiguation. The clearest way of show-
ing this is to confront point-based explanations with the thesis, which
one finds in the work of Michael Dummett and in a different form
also in the literature on thick concepts, that mastery of at least some
concepts is itself point-based—a thesis I shall refer to asMPB. When
juxtaposed with point-based explanations,MPB clearly generates a
tension and a need for disambiguation, for how can revealing the
point of a concept we use be informative if one already needs to have
grasped that point in order to master the concept? In §2, I distinguish
four types of points which concepts can be said to have: the practical
point, the evaluative point, the animating point, and the inferential point.
In §3, I then identify which type is at stake in point-based explanation
and for which typeMPB holds; based on these clarifications, I resolve
the tension between MPB and point-based explanation by showing
that point-based explanation brings out something we need not al-
ready know about a concept in order to master it, and I argue that
disambiguating between types of points allows us to identify in more
precise terms what the proper remit of MPB is, acknowledging its
plausibility in two limited senses without overgeneralising it into an
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intellectualist account of concept use. Finally, in §4, I show how point-
based explanation can exploit the functional connections between the
different types of points to make sense of why we take the point of
a concept to be something other than the practical point it actually
serves. Understanding why a concept has an animating or inferential
point that diverges from its practical point can indicate that the points
diverge for ideological reasons, in order to obfuscate the concept’s
practical point; or that they diverge for benignly functional reasons,
in order better to serve that practical point.
1. Point-Based Mastery of Concepts
The ambition of point-based explanations to be informative seems to
be in tension with the thesis, which has been defended in a variety of
forms in twentieth-century philosophy,4 thatmastery of at least certain
concepts is itself already point-based. This thesis can be articulated
more precisely as follows:
(MPB) For some concepts, it is a necessary condition on mastering
the concept (i.e. on being able to apply it correctly) that one
grasp the point of that concept.
Aspects ofMPB that call for scrutiny include the notion of mastery or
ability to apply concepts correctly, the standard of correctness involved
therein, and the extent to which this mastery comes in degrees. In
this paper, however, I shall treat these as given and focus entirely on
the notion of the point of a concept. Distinguishing between different
senses we can give to this widely used but far from transparent phrase
will shed light on different versions of MPB and their relation to
point-based explanation.
4 See Dancy (1995); Dummett (1959; 1973, 296–98); McDowell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c).
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The historical roots ofMPB reach at least as far back as Wittgen-
stein, in whose later work the point of language games is a recurring
concern.5 We later find the thesis lucidly articulated (in what we shall
see is a variety of different versions) by Michael Dummett. Echoing
Wittgenstein (2009, §§564–68), Dummett lends intuitive plausibility to
MPB by drawing an analogy between concept use and the game of
chess. He suggests that in order to be a competent chess player, it is
not enough to know the rules by which the pieces move; one cannot
be a competent chess player without understanding that the point of
the game is to checkmate the king. Analogously, Dummett suggests,
merely describing the usage of a concept is not enough to master it;
one has to grasp the point of the concept.6
MPB has also been prominent among advocates of the idea that the
extensions of thick concepts—concepts which are both world-guided
and action-guiding due to their combining descriptive and evaluative
aspects—would be shapelesswere it not for some grasp of the concepts’
points: without grasping a thick concept’s point, one would be at a
loss to decide, on the basis of past applications of the concept, whether
some new item should be seen as one more instance of that concept or
not.7 As Bernard Williams puts the key idea, which he traces via John
McDowell, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch to Wittgenstein (Williams
2011, 263n7): ‘to understand how such a concept can be applied to a
new sort of situation it is likely that onewill have to grasp its evaluative
point’ (Williams 1995b, 206).8 Jonathan Dancy elaborates: ‘A person
5 See Ertz (2008) for a sustained discussion of the notion of the point or Witz in
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
6 See, e.g., Dummett (1959; 1973, 295–98). For purposes of exposition, I pass over the
subtleties and complications introduced by each of these passages. I give a more
nuanced account of the different ideas Dummett conveys in these passages below.
7 See Dancy (1995); Kail (2007, 73–74); Kirchin (2010); Roberts (2011, 2013).
8 A further example is Elizabeth Anderson’s claim that the ‘factual components of
thick concepts are selected to track their underlying evaluative point’ (2004, 14).
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from another culture who failed to see the evaluative point of a thick
concept would not be able to predict local use of it on the basis of
descriptive similarities alone’ (Dancy 1995, 263).
It is clear already from this brief discussion that there is a need for
disambiguation here, for how can exhibiting the point of a concept
tell competent concept-users anything new if they already need to
have grasped that point in order to be competent concept-users? In
some respects, this problem of how a point-based explanation can
be informative given that one already needs to have grasped the
point to begin with is akin to the paradox of analysis, the problem
of how a successful definition or conceptual analysis can be infor-
mative given that the definiens/analysans must be identical with the
definiendum/analysandum.9 One might speak here of the ‘paradox of
point-based explanation,’ were it not for the fact that the problem
all too obviously calls for resolution through disambiguation (and
thus fails to present us, as a paradox worthy of the name would,
with intuitively plausible premises that jointly entail an unacceptable
conclusion). However, it is precisely because it so obviously calls for
disambiguation that this tension is useful in motivating the present
project. Clearly, what Williams and Dancy mean by ‘the point of the
concept’ is not the same as what Dummett means by it,10 and we
therefore need a typology of points.
9 On the paradox of analysis, see Bealer (1982); Beaney (2014); Cobb (2001); Dutilh
Novaes and Reck (2017); Earl (2007); Fumerton (1983).
10 To anticipate, I shall argue that what Williams and Dancy mean is that one has to
grasp the ‘evaluative point’ of a concept, whereas Dummett means that one has to
grasp the ‘animating point’ of the concept.
7 • Matthieu Queloz
2. Four Types of Points: Practical, Evaluative, Animating, and Infer-
ential
According to the typology I want to propose in this paper, talk of the
‘point of concepts’ is ambiguous between at least the following four
senses: the practical, the evaluative, the animating, and the inferential
point. Let us consider each in turn.
(1) The Practical Point of a Concept: the salient practical consequence
of using a concept at all, i.e. the salient useful difference which the
concept actually makes to the lives of concept-users. Jane Heal nicely
articulates the most general motivation for focusing on the practical
point of concepts:
. . . our concepts are bound up with our interests, that is to say things
which matter to us because their presence in human life contributes
to that life going well. What motivates the assumption is the fact
that we are finite in our cognitive resources while the world is
immensely rich in kinds of feature and hence in the possibilities it
offers for conceptualization. Given our finitude, the fact that use of
a certain concept enables the making of true judgements employing
that concept does not, by itself, make intelligible our possession of it.
Intelligibility requires further that thinking in terms of the concept
is a worthwhile use of resources for us, in that it enables or enriches
realization of one or more of our interests. (Heal 2013, 342)
But what should we treat as a ‘realization of one or more of our
interests’? The characterisation of a concept’s practical point as the
salient useful difference it actually makes to the lives of concept-users
will be too broad if anything useful about a concept qualifies as its
point. But we can understand it more narrowly by (a) cashing out
usefulness in terms of the extent to which using the concept serves
the needs and interests of concept users; and (b) cashing out saliency
in terms that tie the relevant needs and interests to the particular
explanatory purposes of the theorists in any given case. To say that a
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useful difference is salient, on this view, is not to say that it is salient
to the concept-users themselves—a concept’s practical point need not
be part of what motivates its use or guides its application; it is not
necessarily something which participants are aware of at all. Rather,
to say that a useful difference is salient is to say that among the many
causal effects that use of a concept in a conceptual community actually
produces, one or several are worth singling out in light of the purposes
we theorists bring to the concept. Together, (a) and (b) narrow down
the notion of a practical point, and do so in a manner that is in fact
quite familiar. If one walks into a house, the totality of causal effects
is unsurveyably vast; if one asks which effects serve the needs and
interests of the house’s human inhabitants, one can narrow the field
to effects that have a practical point for them—keeping out humidity,
letting in the light, bringing in electricity, and so on; and if one has
walked into the house to repair the heating system, one has further
guidance as to what kind of practical point one is looking for.
As with any broadly functionalist description, describing some-
thing in terms of its practical point highlights a select few in a vast
network of causal effects, and themerits of the selection depend on our
purposes in so describing them.11 Ifwe as theorists seek an explanation
of why something like the concept of knowledge spread and endured
in just about every human society, as E. J. Craig (1990) does, the fact
that using that concept helps satisfy such a highly generic and basic
human need as the need to gain information about one’s immediate
environment will be a salient useful difference made by the concept.
If, by contrast, we are trying to understand the concept with a view to
offering a feminist critique of it, as Haslanger (1999) does, other useful
differences made by the concept will become salient.
11 See Barnes (1995, 43).
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This last example also indicates that the proposed understanding
of ‘practical point’ should not necessarily be taken to be individualistic,
as it would be if a concept’s usefulness were restricted to the respects
in which it proved useful to the individualwho used it. On the contrary,
a concept’s usefulness may reside in its tendency to serve social needs,
i.e. needs possessed by the community over and above the needs of the
individuals it encompasses (Queloz Forthcoming-d); or a concept’s
usefulness may reside in its tendency to serve the needs of a powerful
group at the expense of the individual concept user, a theme I come
back to in §4.
Thus understood, the notion of a practical point can be found to
be at work in many different areas of the literature. It can be found
in the ‘paradigm-based explanation’ of Miranda Fricker, for example,
who is clearly talking about the practical point when she writes that
the ‘point of blame’ is ‘to increase the alignment of the blamer and the
wrongdoer’s moral understandings’ (2016, 165); or in the ‘genealogy’
of Bernard Williams, who is concerned with the practical point of the
concepts and dispositions involved in cultivating and valuing truth-
fulness when he concludes that truthfulness ‘gets its point ultimately
from the human interest, individual and collective, in gaining and
sharing true information’ (2002, 126);12 or in the ‘teleosemantic expla-
nations’ of Ruth Millikan, according to whom linguistic forms survive
and are stabilised because their effects are of interest to hearers and/or
12 I explore the differences between Fricker’s and Williams’s approach in Queloz
(Forthcoming-a). Both Williams and Fricker are also concerned with other types
of points: on Williams’s (2002, ch. 5) account, the animating point of truthfulness
plays a crucial role in facilitating its subservience to its practical point, and Fricker
(2016, 167) notes that what animates Communicative Blame is the desire to inspire
remorse in the wrongdoer, which is distinct from the practical point of doing so.
Thanks to a reviewer for pressing me on this.
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speakers (2005, 54–63; 2017);13 or in the ‘Cambridge Pragmatism’ ad-
vocated notably by Simon Blackburn (1993, 1998, 2013a, b, 2017a, b)
and Huw Price (2011, 2017; 2013), who seek to naturalise such things
as morality and modality by replacing questions about the nature of
morality or modality with questions about the function or point of
thinking and speaking in moral and modal terms. All these projects
are concerned with the actual useful effects of particular conceptual
practices on concept-users’ lives, effects which may be of a very differ-
ent sort from those that the practices aim at (if they aim at any), and
whichmay or may not be transparent to participants in the practices.14
(2) The Evaluative Point of a Concept: the needs, interests, and val-
ues that together form an evaluative viewpoint which informs and is
betrayed in the application of the concept. A viewpoint is betrayed in
the application of a concept when no such concept application could
have been produced by a concept-user that did not share or at least
imaginatively inhabit that viewpoint.15 What drives the insistence on
the part of McDowell, Williams, Dancy, or Scanlon that one needs to
13 See Thomasson (Forthcoming) for an attempt to adapt Millikan’s approach to the
project of conceptual engineering.
14 While my focus here lies on the fact that all these projects share a concern with
the practical points of concepts, this broad classification papers over substantial
differences in what exactly they take such practical points to be. See Queloz
(Forthcoming-d) for further discussion of some of these differences.
15 A. W. Moore (1997, 84–89) helpfully distinguishes between a representation betray-
ing a point of view and its being from a point of view. While the latter concerns the
nature of a given representation and its role in our thought, the formerconcernswhat
informs the production of that representation under particular circumstances—and
here, as Moore himself says (89), evaluation is often crucial: ‘a representation that
distinguishes between various tonemes betrays the point of view of a Cantonese
speaker (or a speaker of some other tone language), a point of view defined, in
part, by the interests and concerns that make it worthwhile to classify phonemes
in that way’ (84). In Moore’s usage, the fact that a representation betrays a point of
view crucially does not entail that it is a representation from a point of view.
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‘grasp the evaluative point’16 of thick concepts in order to apply them
correctly is the conviction that, in virtue of the way in which thick
concepts combine the evaluative and the descriptive, evaluation feeds
into the determination of the extension of such concepts, which is why
one needs to occupy, at least in imagination, a certain evaluative stance
in order to apply them correctly. Scanlon unpacks the idea thus: ‘In
order to trace the contours of the ethical concept’s applicability we
have to understand its evaluative point . . . we must be guided by the
evaluative perspective of a thick concept in order to apply it’ (2003,
276). Williams glosses the ‘evaluative point of the concept’ as ‘the
outlook of those who use it’ (1995b, 206). Elsewhere, he elaborates on
this as follows:
It has been increasingly accepted in recent discussions that the appli-
cation of such concepts is guided by their evaluative point, and that
one cannot understand themwithout grasping that point. (This does
not mean that anyone who understands such a concept must have
adopted it as his or her own, but it does mean that he or she needs to
have imaginatively identified, as an ethnographer does, with those
who use it.) (Williams 1996, 29)
The key idea in these debates is that the application of a thick concept
is informed or guided by evaluation on the part of the user of the concept.
Talk of the ‘evaluative point’ of a concept is slightly misleading in
this respect, because what it refers to is not so much the point of
that concept as the set of needs, interests, and values forming the
evaluative viewpoint that informs and is betrayed in the application
of the concept.17 To grasp the ‘evaluative point’ of a concept is thus
to grasp what sort of evaluation on the part of its user goes into its
correct application.
16 See Dancy (1995, 263); Scanlon (2003, 276); Williams (1995a, 563; 1995b, 206; 1996,
29; 2011, 157). The same phrase is used by Anderson (2004, 14); Hart (1986, 12);
Kirchin (2013, 12).
17 See Thomas (2006, 146) for a nuanced discussion which supports this reading.
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(3) The Animating Point of a Concept: the aim, goal, or ideal concept-
users consciously pursue in applying the concept, and in terms of
which concept-users make sense of the practice of using the concept.
The animating point of chess, which Dummett refers to, is to achieve a
checkmate position (or,more allegorically, to kill the king).18Mastering
games generally involves having a clear sense of what the game’s
animating point is—of what, in playing the game, one is trying to do,
where this is and needs to be distinct from the aim of winning the
game.19 This suggests that for a concept to possess an animating point,
it is a condition on counting as a competent participant in the practice
that one have a fairly clear sense of what the animating point of the
conceptual practice is. This requirement admits of degrees, of course,
but so does competence in participating in a practice: the animating
point of soccer or football, for example, is to score more goals than
your opponent, and since every move in the game is animated by
that aim and must contribute to its attainment in order to count as a
competent move, someone who failed to grasp the animating point
of the game will quickly betray that fact.20 Evidently, not all concepts
have a well-determined animating point in this sense. But as Ingo
Brigandt has argued, for example, when a scientific concept such as
the concept of a gene is introduced by scientists with fairly specific
scientific aims in mind—what Brigandt calls their “epistemic goal”
(2010)—these aims animate the conceptual practice, motivating use of
the concept and guiding its application and perhaps even its change
over time. While this is unlikely to generalise to all concepts (Brigandt
andRosario Forthcoming; Cappelen 2018, 185), there are some concepts
18 As we shall see, Dummett also deploys the notion of a point in other ways.
19 See Suits (2005, 48) for why there has to be an animating point of chess analytically
distinct from winning.
20 See Ertz (2008, 62–71).
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where the conscious aims, goals, or ideals of concept-users determine a
task and thereby set a standard for the use of the concept to meet. This
task may differ from the concept’s practical point; it is a task which
may not in fact be fulfilled, and which the concept may in principle
even be unfit to fulfil; but it is still naturally called ‘the point’ of the
concept—in my terminology, its animating point.
Regicide in chess aside, it is for example the animating point which
is at issue when Elizabeth Anderson presents the point of (the concept
of) equality as being ‘to end oppression’ and ‘to create a community
in which people stand in relations of equality to others’ (1999, 288–89).
The animating point of concepts is also central in certain legal practices,
where authoritative decisions need to bemade even in hard cases. Here
it is part of the practice that its continuation is secured in part by its
being based on and guided by the animating point of the concept.21
Another example—which is more contentious, but which helps focus
the notion of an animating point—is that of concepts involved in
religious practices: consider the initially religious person who comes
to believe that religious concepts serve a variety of immanent social and
psychological functions,andwho thereupon ceases to think in religious
terms altogether; one explanationmight be that this person thinks that
the animating point of these concepts involves something more than
the fulfilment of such immanent functions—that their animating point
is to achieve correspondence to or with a transcendent realm, perhaps.
Here the animating point, together with the realisation that what the
concepts actually do in no way contributes to attaining it, helps explain
why someone would give up certain concepts despite being convinced
that they have social and psychological value in virtue of their practical
point.
21 This is what Dworkin calls ‘constructive interpretation.’ See Dworkin (1986, 2006)
and Brink (2016); de Graaf (2015) for further discussion.
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(4) The Inferential Point of a Concept: the salient inferential consequence
of applying a concept, that is, what properly and centrally follows from
the fact that a concept’s application conditions are satisfied. Grasping
the point of a concept in this sense is what Wilfrid Sellars and Robert
Brandom think sets a bona fide concept-user apart from someone who
just reliably responds differentially to the satisfaction of a concept’s
application conditions.22 It is constitutive of one’s mastery of a concept
that one is able to draw at least the most salient among the proper
inferential consequences of applying it—to understand, for example,
that if an exercise of public powerwas the result of a democraticdecision,
this means that it was to that extent legitimate. Of course, applications
of concepts have many inferential consequences. But among these
consequences are some that strike us as particularly significant given
our concerns, because they tie in with these concerns. This inferential
sense of the point of a concept also figures prominently in Dummett’s
writings, for instance when he considers a pupil who tries to master
the concept of validity as applied to arguments while failing to grasp
that an argument’s being valid is a reason to accept its conclusion if
one accepts its premises:
[I]f he is taught in a very unimaginative way, he may see the clas-
sification of arguments into valid and invalid ones as resembling
the classification of poems into sonnets and non-sonnets, and so
fail to grasp that the fact that an argument is valid provides any
grounds for accepting the conclusion if one accepts the premises. We
should naturally say that he had missed the point of the distinction.
(Dummett 1973, 454)
As Dummett’s example suggests, the relevant notion of an inferential
point does not simply correspond to the notion of an ‘inferential role’
as used in inferential role semantics.23 It is, rather, the notion of a partic-
22 See Sellars (1997) and Brandom (2000, 63–66; 2015, 101–2).
23 See, e.g., Brigandt (2010, 22); Harman (1987).
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ular inferential consequenceworth singling out for its explanatory value, a
value it possesses because it ties in with the concerns of concept-users
in a way in which other inferential consequences do not. In Dummett’s
example, the pupil’s problem is not simply that he has failed to mas-
ter a sufficient number of the inferential moves characteristic of the
concept of validity; he has failed to grasp the one move that makes the
concept worth bothering with in the first place—the one inferential
consequence that enables the concept to guide one’s reasoning and to
improve one’s thinking. Without this inferential connection in particu-
lar, the remaining inferential intricacies of the concept of validity are no
more than idle play or scholastic classification for its own sake, because
they fail to link up with our needs and concerns as reasoners. Just as
talk of a concept’s ‘point’ has its uses when we can profitable single
out one among the various causal consequences of using a concept, so
it has its useswhenwe can profitably single out one among the various
inferential consequences of applying a concept. But as with causal
consequences, which inferential consequence is worth singling out in
any given case will depend on the particular explanatory interests and
assumptions we bring to the concept—the inferential consequences
worth picking out in an evolutionary psychologist’s investigation of
how a concept contributes to biological fitness, say, will differ from
those worth picking out in aMarxist’s investigation of how conceptual
mystification serves capitalist interests.
Distinguishing these four senses of ‘the point of a concept’ thus
brings out that the phrase is multiply ambiguous: it can refer to
the practical consequences of using the concept, the evaluative point
of view betrayed in applying the concept, the aims, goals, or ideals
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guiding andmotivating the application of the concept,or the inferential
consequences of applying the concept.24
3. Sharing Without Grasping:
A Non-Intellectualist Account of Mastery
With these distinctions in place, we can now consider which type of
point is at stake in point-based explanations, and for which type of
point, if any,MPB holds. I shall argue in this section that the point at
stake in point-based explanation is (1), the practical point of concepts,
and that MPB is either false or misleading where (1) and (2), even
though it does hold,with qualifications, for (3) and (4). Thiswill licence
the conclusion that the version ofMPB that is relevant for point-based
explanation does not stand in tensionwith the ambition of point-based
explanation to be informative. And it allows us to identify in more
precise terms what the proper remit of MPB is, acknowledging its
plausibility in two limited senses without overgeneralising it into an
intellectualist account of concept use.
Which type of point is at stake in point-based explanations? A
thorough answer to this question would require an extensive review
and exegesis of the relevant literature. Though I have engaged in some
of that exegesis elsewhere,25 I have no room for it here. I shall therefore
confinemyself to proposing an interpretive hypothesis and to drawing
out its implications (the rest of this paper can be seen as an exploration
24 I use the contrast between concept application and concept use tomark the difference
between (i) the question whether a concept applies on a given instance and (ii) the
question whether we think or should think in these terms at all. When OscarWilde,
upon being asked by the judge whether he denied that his novel was blasphemous,
replied that ‘blasphemy’ was not one of his words (Montgomery Hyde 1973), the
exchange turned on this distinction between concept application and concept use.
25 See Queloz (2017, 2018a, 2018b, Forthcoming-a, Forthcoming-b, Forthcoming-c,
Forthcoming-d).
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of what would follow if this interpretive hypothesis were to prove
correct). The interpretive hypothesis, which I take to be uncontentious
enough, is this: the point at stake in point-based explanations is (1),
the practical point. When E. J. Craig (1990) asks what the point of the
concept of knowledge is, or Bernard Williams (2002) what the point of
valuing the truth is, or Miranda Fricker (2016) what the point of the
practice of blame is, they are all primarily interested in identifying the
useful practical differences which such concepts, values, or practices
make to the lives of creatures like us, where usefulness is cashed out
in terms of the actual tendency to satisfy the needs and interests of
concept-users.
Assuming that point-based explanations are based on (1), the
follow-up question is whetherMPB holds true for (1). I contend that
it does not: we are perfectly capable of mastering concepts without
grasping their practical point. One can be in a position to deploy a
concept correctly in virtue of sharing the needs, interests, and values
that give the concept its practical pointwithout graspingwhat that point
is. Sharing the needs, interests, and values that give the concept its
practical point secures the necessary guidance in the application of a
concept to new situations by rendering certain features salient. Needs,
interests, and values can shape what is salient to us the way our eyes
shape our fieldofvision.26 The terminally thirstyperson neednotgrasp
the practical point of the concept of water in order to recognise water.
Thirst will take care of rendering the more thirst-quenching features
of the world salient. The same is true of thicker concepts: one need not
grasp the practical point of the concept truthfulness in order to apply
it correctly. The person who shares the needs, values, and interests
that render it pointful to live by this concept will normally just see
26 See also Queloz and Cueni (Manuscript).
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the relevant features of the situation that determine the applicability
of the concept.27 It is concern with the features picked out by the
concept, rather than some reflective insight into the practical value
of thinking in these terms, that separates the competent concept-user
from someone towhom the finite set of past applications of the concept
leaves its future use underdetermined.
Consequently, when a concept answers to our needs, interests, and
values, our use of it will be guided by these concerns, and a conscious
grasp of how these concerns bestow a point on the concept will not
be required to master the concept. On this account, it would be an
intellectualist overstatement to maintain that the practical point of
a concept needs to be accessible to competent concept-users—that
a description of that point needs to be among the contents of their
thought. It is only at a more reflective level, if we want to understand
our concepts better, that we have an incentive explicitly to represent
to ourselves the practical point of our concepts and the concerns from
which that point derives. Consequently, and crucially for the purposes
of point-based explanation, to tie the unreflective mastery of a concept
to the graspof its practicalpointwouldbe to over-intellectualise concept
use.
When explicated in terms of (2), the evaluative point,MPB is not so
much false asmisleading: ‘grasping the concept’s point’ then turns out
to mean inhabiting or imaginatively occupying the evaluative point of
view from which the concept’s extension can be made out, something
that is required whenever a concept’s extension is a function of one’s
evaluative stance. Here also the decisive factor is whether one shares, or
can imagine sharing, certain needs, interests, and values. Talk of ‘grasp-
ing the concept’s point’ then suggests something more cognitive and
27 As elaborated by McDowell (1998c, 68–69); Wiggins (1976).
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reflective than what is actually at stake. A less misleading formulation
is the one Williams uses in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophywhen he
writes that ‘it might be impossible to pick up an evaluative concept
unless one shared its evaluative interest’ (2011, 263n7).
AlthoughMPB is either false or misleading when spelled out in
terms of (1) and (2), it can rightly be said to hold for other types
of points. Cashed out in terms of (3), the animating point, it seems
perfectly reasonable: if it is a condition on counting as a competent
participant in a conceptual practice that one have a fairly clear sense
of the animating point of the conceptual practice, then someone who
wanted to master the relevant concept would necessarily have to grasp
its point in that sense. When application of a concept is guided and
motivated by an aim in this way, someone who failed to grasp what
that aim was would be as far from genuinely using the concept as
someone who moved the pieces on a chess board without grasping
the aim of the game would be from genuinely playing chess. But even
in this sense,MPB only holds for a limited range of concepts, because
not all concepts involve such an animating point in the first place.
Finally,MPB has some plausibility also when cashed out in terms
of (4), the inferential point. Here, mastering a concept is explicated in
terms of understanding what follows from the concept’s applicability,
i.e. what inferences it licenses and what one commits oneself to by
applying it. But not all inferences licensed by a concept are on a par.
Many of the inferences licensed by the applicability of the concept
silver are inferences that no-one but a few experts are able to draw,
and yet it would be awkward to say that most people had failed to
master the concept silver (at least in the undemanding sense ofmastery
used in this paper, which equates it with the competence to apply
the concept correctly in everyday circumstances). To the extent that
some of these inferences are plausibly seen as crucial or central to the
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concept—so that someone who failed to draw them could be said not
to have mastered the concept—it is true that mastering the concept
requires grasping its inferential point. But in this sense, mastery is
not an all-or-nothing matter. It comes in degrees. And which among a
concept’s inferential consequences strike one as particularly significant
will again depend on one’s concerns and reasons for using the concept.
Together, these two considerations suggest that the inferential-point
version ofMPB is true but context-sensitive (mastery among laypeople
may not count as mastery among experts), and thatMPB should be
amended to articulate not a necessary condition, but rather the thought
that mastery and inferential capacities progress in lockstep.
In sum, the version ofMPB that is relevant for point-based explana-
tion does not threaten its ambition to be informative, and whileMPB
does hold with qualifications for (3) and (4), it is false or misleading
when spelled out in terms of (1) and (2). In these latter two senses,
mastery of concepts is a matter of sharing the concerns that give a
concept its point rather than a matter of consciously grasping that
point in any strict sense. Hence, ifwe advocateMPBwithout restricting
the meaning and scope of this thesis accordingly, we interpretMPB
too broadly and over-intellectualise concept use. But thanks to the
typology proposed above, we can trace out MPB’s proper remit.
4. Functional Connections and the Point of Divergent Points
I have been arguing that once we differentiate between four types of
points, we can see that where there is a point one must have in mind
in order to count as mastering a concept, that point is typically not
the practical point. But this is itself somewhat puzzling. What is the
point of taking something other than the actual practical point of a
concept to be the point of that concept? In other words, why do we
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not always use our concepts with an eye on whether they are serving
their practical point?
In this last section, I want to draw a more positive picture of the
relations between the four types of points and point-based explanation
which suggests an answer to that question. I shall argue that point-
based explanation allows us to see the functional connections between
different types of points, and that it can exploit these functional con-
nections to explain why these points align or come apart in particular
cases.
The explanatory power of point-based explanation derives from
the fact that it initiates an aspect-shift in how we view our concepts
and invites us to take a view of them we do not usually take: it invites
us to take an instrumental view of our concepts and to regard them
as tools or techniques that are more or less suited to our ends. This
instrumental perspective also brings into view certain criteria of aptness
by which to assess our concepts as tools according to whether they are,
in the practical sense, pointful or pointless for us. For it to make sense
to speak of a concept as having a practical point for a concept-user,
certain conditions need to be fulfilled. To begin with, there must be
certain needs, interests, or values to determine a task in relation to
which the concept can be understood. Then, using the concept must
have effects that tend to be conducive to the fulfilment of that task. And
finally, the concept itself must be such as to be an apt tool for the
production of these effects.
From this instrumental perspective on our concepts, the different
types of points distinguished above all naturally fall into place. The
practical point (1) is the pointfulness or instrumentality of the concept
in fulfilling a certain task and serving certain needs, interests, and
values. The evaluative point (2) is the set of needs, interests, and values
that give the concept its practical point by determining a task for
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it to fulfil. The animating point (3) is the concept-users’ conscious
representation of such a task, while the inferential point (4) is a key
element of the concept’s inferential articulation which contributes to
its being an apt tool for fulfilling that task.
From the instrumental perspective of point-based explanation,
we can then inquire into the functional connections between these
different points and, by showing how they contribute to the concept’s
aptness as a tool, use these connections to explain why the concept
combines these various points in the way it does: the practical point
of a concept given its evaluative point can be used to explain why
its animating point and its inferential point are as they are, and in
particular why they diverge from the practical point—in the typology
outlined above, (1) given (2) can explain (3) and (4).
At bottom, such an explanation works by revealing what the prac-
tical point is of taking something other than the practical point of a
concept to be the animating or inferential point of that concept. The
explanation shows that the concept’s having the animating or inferen-
tial point it does serves a practical point, and that this animating or
inferential point either lines up with the practical point or differs from
it the better to serve that practical point. In some cases, the practical
point of a concept may be best served if its animating point aligns with
its practical point, so that the practical point is overtly understood to
be the ‘name of the game’—this is the case if, assuming the practical
point of the concept is to ϕ, we aim, in applying the concept, to ϕ.
Similarly, the practical point of a concept may be best served if its
inferential point aligns with its practical point, so that it follows from
the concept’s applicability to x that x is a means of ϕ-ing.
But point-based explanation comes into its own where the ani-
mating or inferential point diverges from the practical point. We can
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distinguish three kinds of divergence: contingent divergence, deceptive
divergence, and benign functional divergence.
First, contingent divergence is what we have when a concept’s an-
imating or inferential point fails to line up with its practical point,
but for what, from the instrumental perspective of point-based ex-
planation, must appear as purely contingent reasons. For example, a
concept originally picking out a food item as healthy (i.e. licensing the
inference from x being such a food item to x being healthy) might be
harnessed by a religious movement and come to have as its salient
inferential consequence not that x is healthy, but that x is holy.28 In
this case, assuming the practical point of the concept is to render
concept-users suitably sensitive to the presence of a healthy food item,
the inferential point would come to diverge from the practical point;
but the divergence would be an accident of history, something to be
explained in terms of causes rather than reasons. In cases of contingent
divergence, point-based explanation is of interest because it directs
our attention towards the practical dimension of concepts (e.g. their
effects on health), which helps explain why we have them especially
in cases where that dimension may be veiled by other concerns (e.g.
concern with the holy). The category of contingent divergence allows
for the fact that while our concepts may serve practical purposes in
many respects, and those practical purposes may help explain whywe
have them, the fact that human beings live under culture means that
there is also ample room for our concepts to acquire non-functional
features reflecting the influence of cultural contingencies. Cultural
variation between groups and cultures implies that even if certain
functional features were the same across these variations, our con-
cepts would nevertheless also be shaped by different contingencies in
28 Another example might be the use of concepts of purity by fascist movements as
described by Jason Stanley (2018).
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each case. Hume displays sensitivity to precisely this point when he
writes that houses, though they share certain functional features and
conspicuously ‘point all to a like end’ (EPM, 3.2), also vary from one
culture to another in their non-functional aspects (or aspects that are
functional only relative to more local concerns). Similarly, what our
concepts instrumentally need to be is only a very partial guide to the
form they actually take.
Second, deceptive divergence is what we get if a concept serves a
practical point which, if it became transparent to concept-users, would
lead many of them to give up the concept, because that practical point
is in tensionwith the concept’s animating or inferential point. It is in
this structure thatwe can situate the cases familiar fromCritical Theory
and ideology critique, where diagnoses of ideological functions can
get a grip by showing that the practical point actually served by a
concept radically differs from the aims that animate its use and the
inferences we drawwith it. In such diagnoses, the concepts in terms of
which advocates of human rights, liberalism, or egalitarianism think
and argue, for instance, are made out really to serve the practical
point of promoting Western domination, imperialism, or inequality.29
These diagnoses identify a radical divergence between, on the one
hand, the aims animating the use of such concepts and the salient
inferences drawn from their application, and, on the other hand, the
practical effects of thinking in these terms. The divergence is a deceptive
one because the diverging points are in tension with one another:
the use of the concepts is revealed to be counterproductive by the
evaluative standards these concepts themselves encode. A point-based
explanation identifying such a deceptive divergence can nevertheless
be explanatory by revealing the practical point, for people with an
29 See, e.g., Anghie (2007, 292); Bell (2016); Koskenniemi (2005); Mills (1998); Moyn
(2010); Pagden (1995); Pitts (2005).
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interest in promoting Western domination, imperialism, or inequality,
of deceiving other people—and perhaps even themselves—into taking
the point of these concepts to be a loftier one than the practical point
they actually serve. The animating and inferential points then serve
the divergent practical point by concealing it. Here the functional
connection between the different points is such that it cannot be
entirely transparent to the concept-users if they are to use the concepts
in a fully engaged, non-cynical manner.30
Third, the divergence may also be of a benign functional kind. This
is the case when some outcome is not best achieved by having concept-
users aim for that outcome, but rather by having them be animated by
something other than the desire to achieve that outcome. When the
practical point of a concept is to achieve some common good—such as
the pooling of information, for example—the tragedy of the commons
entails that the common good is under threat as long concept-users
are animated by and conceive of the common good solely in terms of
its instrumental value to them. The best way of reaping the benefits of
the common good may then be for concept-users to be, in Williams’s
phrase, bloody-minded rather than benefit-minded, for instance by
havingpeople thinkof thedisposition to truthfullypass on information
to others as something that is not just instrumentally valuable insofar
as it contributes to the pooling of information (a consideration that
may have little weight for me when I can deceive for gain), but as
something that is valuable in itself.31 On this picture, the practical
30 There are further important questions in this area which I leave aside here, but
which an effective use of point-based explanation for the purposes of ideology
critique would have to raise, such as: How does the practical point of the concept
fare, not just by the lights of its animating point, but all things considered? Whose
needs and purposes does the concept serve, and are these needs and purposes we
want to see satisfied? Thanks to a reviewer for raising these issues.
31 See Williams (2002, 59).
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point of thinking in terms of the concept of truthfulness is that it is
conducive to the effective pooling of information; but the animating
point of the concept that is on ourminds aswe discriminate and choose
between truthful and untruthful behaviour is not this social benefit,
but a concern with the goodness or rightness of truthfulness. Similarly,
the salient inferential consequence we draw from something’s being
an instance of truthfulness is not that it will have contributed to
maintaining a system of epistemic division of labour, but rather that
it is a good thing just because that is the kind of action it is. This
divergence of points is functional because it renders the system of
epistemic division of labour less vulnerable to the dynamics of the
tragedy of the commons. But it is a benign functional divergence
because the functional connection between the different points is
such that it can become entirely transparent to concept-users without
undermining the confidence with which they use the concept. On
the contrary, the functional connection can be made explicit in the
hope of strengthening their confidence in the concept.32 A point-based
explanation will then reveal why the points of the concepts need to
diverge in the way they do, and why it makes good functional sense
for them to do so, because the most effective way to ϕ by means of
the concept of x is to take the animating and inferential points of the
concept to be something other than ϕ-ing.
32 As exemplified by Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness, which is an instrumental
vindication of intrinsic valuing that turns on understanding why there is a benign
functional divergence of points in the concepts Williams discusses under the broad
heading of truthfulness; see Queloz (2018b).
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Conclusion
I have been arguing that we need a typology of points if we are to
put point-based explanation on a clear and solid foundation and to
navigate potential tensions and fruitful connections between different
types of points. On the basis of the typology I have offered in this
paper, I have shown how exactly point-based explanation can avoid
presupposing a grasp of what it is supposed to reveal; I have argued
that this typology allows us to put in its place the otherwise overly
intellectualist thesis that mastering a concept requires one to grasp its
point, and that its proper remit turns out to be fairly limited; and I
have argued that point-based explanation can exploit the functional
connections between the points of concepts to make sense of why we
sometimes take the point of our concepts to be something other than
the practical point they actually serve: a concept’s having a certain
animating or inferential point that differs from its practical point may
serve to conceal its practical point, or it may itself serve that practical
point. It thus turns out that there is a point both to there being, and to
distinguishing between, different types of points.33
Bibliography
Anderson, Elizabeth S. 1999. “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics
109 (2): 287–337.
33 I am indebted to the editorial board of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy as well
as to two anonymous reviewers and an executive editor for generous and helpful
comments on this paper. A second debt is to Markus Stepanians, Anna Gop-
pel, Christian Budnik, Damian Cueni, Muriel Leuenberger, Deborah Mühlebach,
Jelscha Schmid, Markus Wild, Robin McKenna, and Martin Kusch. This work was
supported by grant P0BSP1_162025 of the Swiss National Science Foundation.
The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections • 28
—. 2004. “Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument,
with Lessons from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce.”
Hypatia 19 (1): 1–24.
Anghie, Antony. 2007. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of Inter-
national Law. Vol. 37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barnes, Barry. 1995. The Elements of Social Theory. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Bealer, George. 1982. Quality and Concept. New York: Clarendon Press.
Beaney,Michael. 2014. “Analysis.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
EditedbyEdwardN. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/.
Bell, Duncan. 2016. Reordering theWorld: Essays on Liberalism and Empire.
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Blackburn, Simon. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
—. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2013a. “Pragmatism in Philosophy: The Hidden Alternative.” Philo-
sophic Exchange 41 (1): 2–13.
—. 2013b. “Pragmatism: All or Some?” In Expressivism, Pragmatism
and Representationalism. Edited by Huw Price, 67–84. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
—. 2017a. “Pragmatism: All or Some or All and Some?” In The Practical
Turn: Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century. Edited by
Cheryl Misak and Huw Price, 61–74. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
—. 2017b. Truth: Ideas in Profile. London: Profile Books.
Brandom,Robert. 2000.Articulating Reasons. Cambridge,MA: Harvard
University Press.
—. 2015. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
29 • Matthieu Queloz
Brigandt, Ingo. 2010. “The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting
for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation.” Synthese 177
(1): 19–40.
Brigandt, Ingo, and Esther Rosario. Forthcoming. “Strategic Concep-
tual Engineering for Epistemic and Social Aims.” In Conceptual
Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Edited by Alexis Burgess, Her-
man Cappelen and David Plunkett. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Brink, David O. 2016. “Originalism and Constructive Interpretation.”
In The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin. NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press.
Burgess,Alexis,HermanCappelen,andDavidPlunkett, eds. Forthcom-
ing. Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2013a. “Conceptual Ethics I.”
Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091–1101.
—. 2013b. “Conceptual Ethics II.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1102–1110.
doi:10.1111/phc3.12085.
Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual
Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen,Herman, andDavidPlunkett. Forthcoming. “AGuidedTour
of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics.” In Conceptual
Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Edited byAlexis Burgess,Herman
Cappelen and David Plunkett. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cobb, Jeffrey. 2001. “Problems for linguistic solutions to the paradox
of analysis.”Metaphilosophy 32 (4): 419-426.
Craig, Edward. 1990. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in
Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
—. 1993.Was wir wissen können: Pragmatische Untersuchungen zum Wis-
sensbegriff.Wittgenstein-Vorlesungen der Universität Bayreuth. Edited
by Wilhelm Vossenkuhl. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections • 30
—. 2007. “Genealogies and the State of Nature.” In Bernard Williams.
Edited by Alan Thomas, 181–200. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Dancy, Jonathan. 1995. “In Defense of Thick Concepts.” Mid-
west Studies In Philosophy 20 (1): 263–279. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
4975.1995.tb00316.x.
de Graaf, Francisca Christina Wilhelmina. 2015. “Dworkin’s Construc-
tive Interpretation as a Method of Legal Research.” Law and Method
12. 10.5553/REM/.000012.
Dogramaci, Sinan. 2012. “Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 513–530.
Dummett, Michael. 1959. “Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
59 (1): 141–162. 10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.141.
—. 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language. New York: Harper and Row.
Dutilh Novaes, Catarina. 2018. “Carnapian Explication and Ame-
liorative Analysis: A Systematic Comparison.” Synthese: 1–24.
10.1007/s11229-018-1732-9.
Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, and Erich Reck. 2017. “Carnapian Explica-
tion, Formalisms as Cognitive Tools, and the Paradox of Adequate
Formalization.” Synthese 194 (1): 195–215. 10.1007/s11229-015-0816-
z.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
—. 2006. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Earl, Dennis. 2007. “A semantic resolution of the paradox of analysis.”
Acta Analytica 22 (3): 189-205.
Ertz, Timo-Peter. 2008. Regel und Witz:Wittgensteinsche Perspektiven auf
Mathematik, Sprache und Moral. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Fricker,Miranda. 2016. “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based
Explanation.” Noûs 50 (1): 165–183.
31 • Matthieu Queloz
—. Forthcoming. “Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism.” Australasian
Philosophical Review.
Fumerton, Richard A. 1983. “The Paradox of Analysis.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 43 (4): 477–497.
Gardiner, Georgi. 2015. “Teleologies and the Methodology of Episte-
mology.” In Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Edited by
JohnGreco andDavidHenderson,31–45. Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press.
Greco, John, and David Henderson, eds. 2015. Epistemic Evaluation:
Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hannon, Michael. 2015. “The Universal Core of Knowledge.” Synthese
192 (3): 769–786. 10.1007/s11229-014-0587-y.
—. 2019. What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert. 1987. “(Non-Solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics.”
In New Directions in Semantics. Edited by Ernest Lepore, 55–81.
London: Academic Press.
Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus. 1986. “Who Can Tell Right from
Wrong?” The New York Review of Books 33: 12.
Haslanger, Sally. 1999. “What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be:
Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology.” Noûs 33 (Supple-
ment s13): 459–80.
—. 2000. “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want
Them to
Be?” Noûs 34 (1): 31–55.
—. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Heal, Jane. 2013. “Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and
Second Person Authority.”Mind 122 (486): 339–71.
The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections • 32
Henderson, David. 2009. “Motivated Contextualism.” Philosophical
Studies 142 (1): 119–31.
—. 2011. “Gate-Keeping Contextualism.” Episteme 8 (1): 83–98.
Henderson, David, and Terence Horgan. 2015. “What’s the Point?” In
Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Edited by John Greco
and David Henderson, 87–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
EPM: Hume, David. 1998. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kail,Peter J. E. 2007. Projection andRealism inHume’s Philosophy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kelp, Christoph. 2011. “What’s the Point of ‘Knowledge’ Anyway?”
Episteme 8 (1): 53–66.
Kirchin, Simon. 2010. “The Shapelessness Hypothesis.” Philosophers’
Imprint 10 (4): 1–28.
—. 2013. “Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts.” In Thick Concepts.
Edited by Simon Kirchin, 1–19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2005. “International Law in Europe: Between
Tradition and Renewal.” European Journal of International Law 16 (1):
113–124.
Kusch, Martin. 2009. “Testimony and the Value of Knowledge.” In
EpistemicValue. EditedbyAdrianHaddock,AlanMillar andDuncan
Pritchard, 60–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kusch,Martin, andRobinMcKenna. 2018a. “TheGenealogicalMethod
in Epistemology.” Synthese. 10.1007/s11229-018-1675-1.
—. 2018b. “The Genealogy of Relativism and Absolutism.” InMetaepis-
temology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Edited by Christos Kyriacou and
Robin McKenna, 217–239. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
MacFarlane, John. 2014. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its
Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33 • Matthieu Queloz
McDowell, John Henry. 1998a. “AreMoral Requirements Hypothetical
Imperatives?” InMind, Value, and Reality, 77–94. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
—. 1998b. “Values and SecondaryQualities.” InMind,Value, and Reality,
131–50. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—. 1998c. “Virtue and Reason.” In Mind, Value, and Reality, 50–76.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McPherson, Tristram, and David Plunkett. Forthcoming. “Conceptual
Ethics and the Methodology of Normative Inquiry.” In Conceptual
Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Edited byAlexis Burgess,Herman
Cappelen and David Plunkett. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mikkel, Gerken. 2015. “The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epis-
temic Assessment.” European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1): 141–161.
doi:10.1111/ejop.12026.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 2005. Language: A Biological Model. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
—. 2017. Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mills, Charles W. 1998. Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race.
New York: Cornell University Press.
Montgomery Hyde, Harford. 1973. The Trials of Oscar Wilde. New York:
Dover.
Moore, Adrian W. 1997. Points of View. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Moyn, Samuel. 2010. The Last Utopia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Pagden, Anthony. 1995. Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in
Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press.
The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections • 34
Pitts, Jennifer. 2005. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism
in Britain and France. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press.
Plunkett, David. 2015. “Which Concepts ShouldWe Use? Metalinguis-
tic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.” Inquiry 58
(7–8): 828–874.
—. 2016. “Conceptual History, Conceptual Ethics, and the Aims of
Inquiry: A Framework for Thinking about the Relevance of the
History/Genealogy of Concepts to Normative Inquiry.” Ergo: An
Open Acces Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 27–64.
Price, Huw. 1988. Facts and the Function of Truth. Oxford: Blackwell.
—. 2003. “Truth as Convenient Friction.” The Journal of Philosophy 100
(4): 167–190.
—. 2011. Naturalism Without Mirrors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2017. “Ramsey’s Ubiquitous Pragmatism.” In The Practical Turn:
Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century. Edited by Cheryl
Misak and Huw Price, 149–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Price, Huw, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich, and
Michael Williams. 2013. Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representa-
tionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Queloz, Matthieu. 2017. “Nietzsche’s Pragmatic Genealogy of Jus-
tice.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4): 727–749.
10.1080/09608788.2016.1266462.
—. 2018a. “HowGenealogiesCanAffect the Space ofReasons.”Synthese
Online First. 10.1007/s11229-018-1777-9.
—. 2018b. “Williams’s PragmaticGenealogyandSelf-EffacingFunction-
ality.”Philosophers’ Imprint 18 (17): 1–20. 2027/spo.3521354.0018.017.
—. Forthcoming-a. “From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic
Genealogy.”MIND. 10.1093/mind/fzy083.
35 • Matthieu Queloz
—. Forthcoming-b. “Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A
Mismatch?” The Philosophical Quarterly. 10.1093/pq/pqy041.
—. Forthcoming-c. “Nietzsches affirmative Genealogien.” Deutsche
Zeitschrift für Philosophie.
—. Forthcoming-d. “Revealing Social Functions through Pragmatic
Genealogies.” In Social Functions in Philosophy:Metaphysical, Norma-
tive, and Methodological Perspectives. Edited by Rebekka Hufendiek,
Daniel James and Raphael Van Riel. London: Routledge.
Queloz, Matthieu, and Damian Cueni. Manuscript. “Left Wittgen-
steinianism.”
Reynolds,StevenL. 2017.Knowledge asAcceptable Testimony. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Richard,Mark. Forthcoming. “TheA-Project and the B-Project.” InCon-
ceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Edited by Alexis Burgess,
Herman Cappelen and David Plunkett. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Roberts, Debbie. 2011. “Shapelessness and the Thick.” Ethics 121 (3):
489–520.
—. 2013. “Thick Concepts.” Philosophy Compass 8 (8): 677–688.
Scanlon, Thomas M. 2003. “Thickness and Theory.” The Journal of
Philosophy 100 (6): 275–287.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Edited by
Richard Rorty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Stanley, Jason. 2018. How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them.
New York: Random House.
Suits, Bernard. 2005. The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia. Ontario:
Broadview Press.
Thomas, Alan. 2006. Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political
Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections • 36
Thomasson, Amie L. Forthcoming. “A Pragmatic Method for Concep-
tual Ethics.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Edited
by Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen and David Plunkett. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wiggins, David. 1976. “Deliberation and Practical Reason.” Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1): 29–52.
Williams, Bernard. 1995a. “Ethics.” In Philosophy 1: A Guide Through
the Subject. Edited by A. C. Grayling, 545–582. New York: Oxford
University Press.
—. 1995b. “Replies.” In World,Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical
Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Edited by J. E. J. Altham and Ross
Harrison, 185–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 1996. “Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look.” In The Blackwell
Companion to Philosophy. Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric P.
Tsui-James, 23–35. Oxford: Blackwell.
—. 2002. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
—. 2011. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Routledge Classics. London
and New York: Routledge.
Williams,Michael. 2013. “HowPragmatists can be Local Expressivists.”
In Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Edited by Huw
Price, 128–144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosoph-
ical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte. Edited by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. rev.
4th ed. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
